LibrePortal/docs/roadmap/updates-and-distribution.md

# LibrePortal — Updates, Improvements & Distribution (Roadmap / Vision)

**Status:** §0–§7 are the brainstorm (vision). **§8 is the committed format spec** and the open forks (§6) are resolved there. · **Audience:** us, future-self · **Scope:** the updater feature, "hotfixes", and how third-party themes/apps/components get distributed · **Origin:** brainstorm 2026-05-30/31 → format decided & Phase 1 built 2026-05-31

> Sections 0–7 below are the original thinking doc — kept verbatim so the
> reasoning isn't lost. **The conclusion of that brainstorm is §8: the concrete
> artifact format**, designed so apps/themes/components slot into the same pipe a
> hotfix uses. Phase 1 of it (the signed-fetch+verify read primitive) is already
> built — see §8.7. The forks in §6 are no longer open; §8.5 records how each was
> resolved.

---

## 0. The one idea everything hangs off

The cohesion worry that started this: the updater feels like a **bolt-on**. The fix
isn't to hide it — it's to notice that hotfixes, app updates, themes, and components
are all the *same verb*:

> **LibrePortal pulls a signed, declarative thing from a source, verifies it, and
> applies it reversibly (snapshot → apply → rollback).**

Build that **one distribution primitive** once, and hotfixes / app-installs / themes /
components become three *payloads* through one pipe — not three separate features.
That single primitive is the spine of this whole doc.

It rides machinery that already exists:
- **Mutations via tasks** — every apply is a `libreportal …` task, never a new mutating API.
- **Scan-and-manifest** — a thing is "installed" by dropping a folder; the scan discovers it.
- **Recovery** — the updater already snapshots-before-update and can roll back. Everything inherits that safety net for free. *This is what makes bold defaults defensible.*
- **minisign** — release signing infra already exists; reuse it as the trust anchor.
- **The existing update-check pipe** — already pings out for "is there a new version"; extend that *one signed manifest*, don't add a second phone-home.

---

## 1. Hotfixes

**What it is:** a small, signed, individually-reversible, **declarative** change the
LibrePortal team ships *out-of-band* (between releases), each with a plain-English
what + why, each independently toggleable.

**The killer use case — upstream breakage.** Self-hosters get burned independently when
an upstream image changes something (Vaultwarden renames an env var, Jellyfin moves a
data dir, an app's `latest` tag breaks on a Tuesday). A hotfix channel turns the team's
collective firefighting into a shipped product: *we notice, push a one-line reversible
fix, it lands on every install within hours.* No single self-hoster can replicate that.

**Content flavors:**
- **Upstream-breakage fixes** (the killer one)
- **Security hardening** (tighten a default header, disable a risky default)
- **Compatibility shims** (ARM, rootless, specific kernels)
- **Quality-of-life tweaks** ("cool tweaks we found useful")

**The supply-chain contract (non-negotiable for this project):** an on-by-default,
auto-fetched, auto-applied feed *is* a remote-code channel into every box. So:
- **Signed** — minisign, our key.
- **Declarative, not arbitrary scripts** — "set config key K", "add compose label L",
  "patch file F *only if its checksum matches*". Bounded + auditable, not `run this .sh`.
- **Public + identical for everyone** — same transparency model as the warrant canary.
  A publicly-logged feed makes a *targeted* hotfix to one victim impossible to send silently.
- **Rides the existing update-check pipe** — no new phone-home, no new metadata leak.
- **Nothing silent** — every applied hotfix lands in **History** with what / why / revert.

**On "enabled by default" (UNDECIDED — see open forks):** leaning toward splitting by
severity — *security/breakage* auto-applies (rollback has your back); *tweaks/QoL* are
surfaced with one-click apply, or auto only if the user opted into "auto-improve."

**Why on-by-default is even defensible:** because Recovery already exists — every hotfix
is reversible through the same task → snapshot → apply path. The safety net unlocks the
bold default.

`TODO` (when prioritized):
- [x] Define the declarative hotfix schema (the allowed operations + checksum preconditions). → **§8.2**
- [x] Decide auto-apply policy (uniform vs severity-split). → **§8.5 fork 2** (severity-split)
- [x] Fetch + verify the signed manifest on the same channel as the version check. → **§8.7 Phase 1 (built)**
- [ ] Apply pipeline for the ops (snapshot → apply → verify → rollback → History). → §8.7 Phase 2
- [ ] Surface applied/available hotfixes as a stream in the updater + History audit trail. → §8.7 Phase 3

---

## 2. Reframe the updater → "Updates & Improvements"

The updater's identity is currently fuzzy ("a list of app versions" — which honestly
*could* just be a tab on the app page, which is why it reads as bolted-on). Hotfixes give
it a reason to be its own thing. Rename the concept from **"App Updater"** to
**"Updates & Improvements"** — the single front door for *everything that changes your
install from the outside*:

- **App updates** (version bumps)
- **Security** (CVEs — the urgent stuff)
- **Hotfixes** (curated small improvements — §1)
- **Recovery** (the safety net that makes all of it safe to apply)
- **History** (audit trail of everything applied)

That earns the standalone link and answers the earlier "should this fold into Admin / be
a tab on apps?" question: it stays its own section *because* it's now the curated-improvement
channel, not just a version list. (Existing tabs already are Overview / Updates / Security /
Recovery / History — this is mostly a framing + the hotfix stream, not a rebuild.)

`TODO`:
- [ ] Decide on the rename / framing in the UI.
- [ ] Add the Hotfixes stream as a tab or a section within Overview.

---

## 3. Distribution: a **registry**, not a **marketplace**

For getting third-party **apps / components / themes** onto a box: do **not** build an
upload platform (the Google-Play / Nextcloud-store / npm shape = hosting + accounts +
moderation + liability for code running near-root on people's boxes). That's the
worst-fitting shape for a privacy/no-managed-hosting/blind-relay project.

**Want Nextcloud's *UX* (in-app browse + one-click install) on F-Droid's *backend*** (a
signed, git-published index of recipes pointing at authors' own repos; contribution = a PR
to the index repo; you host a static signed JSON, not an upload server). Power users can
add a **custom source URL** (a "tap"), so the ecosystem is open without you being the host
or gatekeeper.

### 3.1 Why our apps aren't Nextcloud's apps (the key insight)

A **Nextcloud app** is a PHP plugin running *inside* the Nextcloud process — it can do
anything, which is why Nextcloud needs a code-signing CA + review. A **LibrePortal app**
is a *whole separate container we orchestrate* (upstream's image, from upstream's
registry). What a user "adds" is a **definition** (image, ports, config keys, routing) —
*wiring*, not in-process code. That's a much smaller, more declarative trust surface.
Lean into it.

### 3.2 The one real danger to design around

A LibrePortal app definition can ship host-side `tools/*.sh` hooks that run via the task
system. The compose/config is declarative + safe-ish; **the hook scripts are the
arbitrary-code part** (our equivalent of Nextcloud's in-process PHP). So tier trust around
*that*:

| Tier | Signed by | Host scripts | UI |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Official** | LibrePortal team key | allowed (reviewed) | green check |
| **Community** | author key | disallowed / sandboxed / **shown for review before install** | yellow "community — review the source", extra confirm |
| **Custom source** | author key / unsigned | advanced | "you're on your own" framing |

### 3.3 Install flow (all existing machinery)

Browse catalog → click **Add** → WebUI dispatches a task (`libreportal app add <signed-source>`)
→ fetch definition, verify signature/checksum, drop into `containers/<app>/`, run scan/regen,
app appears. Snapshot-before + reversible uninstall via Recovery. No new mutating API.

`TODO`:
- [ ] Build the signed-fetch + reversible-install primitive (§0) — hotfixes need it too.
- [ ] Surface first-party app definitions as a browsable "Browse & Add" catalog in the App Center.
- [ ] Define the trust tiers + how host scripts are gated for community sources.
- [ ] (later) The signed git index format + "add custom source" UX.
- [ ] (later) Theme gallery on the same index (lowest risk, but still signed — CSS can exfil via `background-image`).

---

## 4. Sequencing — don't build the storefront before there are goods

You have one theme set, a handful of first-party apps, and zero community contributions
today. A registry with nothing in it is pure overhead. So:

1. **First-party catalog UX now** — surface our own app definitions as browse-and-add.
   Useful day one with no third parties; first-party apps *are* the seed catalog.
2. **The signed-fetch + reversible-install primitive** underneath (hotfixes need it anyway).
3. **Open to a community index** only once there's real demand. The index is a one-file
   signed artifact you add the day the first good community app/theme exists — not a platform.

Same staging applies to hotfixes (first-party only, always) and themes.

---

## 5. Money / Connect note

A *paid* marketplace contradicts the decided Connect direction (blind relay, no managed
hosting; value = privacy relay + support stack). If money ever enters, "curated/supported
components *as part of Connect*" fits the model; "host a store and take a cut" does not.
Flag only — not on the table.

---

## 6. Open forks (RESOLVED — see §8.5)

> These were the genuinely-undecided questions. They are now decided; §8.5 holds
> the resolutions and the reasoning. Kept here for the record.


1. **Hotfix scope** — config/compose tweaks only, or can a hotfix patch app files / our own WebUI code too? (Sets the entire risk profile.)
2. **Auto-apply policy** — uniformly on-by-default, or split by severity (security auto, tweaks surface-and-suggest)?
3. **Hotfix locality** — per-app (also shows on the app's page) vs system-wide vs both?
4. **Third-party contribution — yet?** Or first-party-curated for the foreseeable future? If the latter, skip the index entirely and just build the signed-fetch primitive; "registry" is a v2 concern.
5. **App catalog entry point** — curated Browse-&-Add list, or bring-your-own-compose (add an arbitrary container) as the primary entry, or both?

---

## 7. Stuff we discussed but didn't capture here

*(Placeholder — there were more conclusions from the brainstorm that didn't make it in.
Add them as they resurface.)*

- [ ] _…_

---

# Part II — The format (committed spec)

## 8. The artifact format

This is the concrete shape the brainstorm landed on. It was stress-tested by a
four-lens design pass (marketplace-first, security-first, simplicity/reuse-first,
ops-ux-first) that **converged** on the same model — *marketplace-first* scored
top, with security-first's **publishers-map trust anchor** and ops-ux's **per-op
`undo` array** grafted in. That convergence is why it's promoted from "vision" to
"spec". The whole thing is **one verb over a type-tagged envelope**; a hotfix is
the first artifact type, and apps/themes/components are *new envelope rows*, not
new features.

### 8.0 Three layers (each already half-built)

| Layer | What it is | Reuses |
|---|---|---|
| **INDEX** | A static, team-signed JSON catalog at `$base/$channel/index.json` (+ `.minisig`), in the **same release tree as `latest.json`**. A list of artifact ENVELOPES. | `fetch.sh` downloaders, the footprint signing key, the existing update-check phone-home |
| **ENVELOPE** | One artifact entry. **Fixed** metadata for every type; the *only* type-specific part is `payload`, a tagged union keyed by `payload.kind`. | — (new, but tiny + frozen) |
| **PIPELINE** | The verb: fetch → verify(sha256+sig) → snapshot → apply → verify → auto-rollback → History. | `lpFetchRelease`/`lpVerifyMinisig`, `updaterApplyApp` (snapshot/rollback/History), the task system |

The envelope **never changes** as new types arrive. Only two fields carry the
type information: `type` and `payload.kind`. That is the whole marketplace seam.

### 8.1 The INDEX + ENVELOPE (example)

`get.libreportal.org/stable/index.json` (signed by `index.json.minisig`):

```jsonc
{
  "schema": 1,
  "index_serial": 17,                 // monotonic; anti-rollback (TUF-lite)
  "valid_until": 1750000000,          // epoch; a stale feed is REFUSED (anti-withholding)
  "generated_at": "2026-05-31T12:00:00Z",
  "publishers": {                     // TRUST ANCHOR map — the team-signed index vouches for it
    "libreportal": { "display": "LibrePortal", "role": "official", "key": "RWR…" }
    // future: "alice": { "display": "Alice", "role": "community", "key": "RWS…" }
  },
  "artifacts": [
    {
      "id": "hf-vaultwarden-signup-env-2026-05",   // stable, unique — the History/snapshot/toggle key
      "type": "hotfix",                              // hotfix | app | theme | component  (the dispatch axis)
      "version": 1,                                  // monotonic per id
      "supersedes": [],                              // ids this retires (also the recall mechanism)
      "reversible": true,                            // false ⇒ extra confirm before apply
      "publisher": "libreportal",                    // a KEY into index.publishers (NEVER inline)
      "trust": "official",                           // honored only if the publisher's role permits it
      "severity": "breakage",                        // security|breakage|compat|tweak
      "auto": true,                                  // see §8.5 fork 2 (severity-split default)
      "title": "Fix Vaultwarden signup after upstream env rename",
      "why": "Upstream renamed SIGNUPS_ALLOWED; logins break until the new key is set.",
      "applies_when": {                              // the "target" gates; missing = always
        "app": "vaultwarden", "min_lp": "1.0.0", "max_lp": null,
        "max_footprint": 4, "image_match": null, "requires": [], "conflicts": []
      },
      "payload": {
        "kind": "ops",                               // ops (hotfix) | bundle (app/theme/component)
        "url": "stable/payloads/hf-vaultwarden-signup-env-2026-05.json",
        "sha256": "…", "sig": "stable/payloads/hf-…json.minisig"
      }
    }
  ]
}
```

**Fixed fields, identical for every type:** `id, type, version, supersedes, reversible,
publisher, trust, severity, auto, title, why, applies_when, payload{kind,url,sha256,sig}`.
An app entry is byte-for-byte this shape with `type:"app"`, `payload.kind:"bundle"`, and a
tarball payload. A theme is `type:"theme"`, `kind:"bundle"`. Nothing in the envelope moves.

**`publisher` is a key, never inline.** It points at an entry in the index-root
`publishers` map, which the *team-signed index* vouches for (`{display, role, key}`). An
artifact's claimed `trust` is honored **only if** (a) the referenced publisher's `role`
permits it **and** (b) the artifact's own signature verifies against that publisher's
`key`. Because the manager can't edit the (signed) index, it can't self-promote a key — so
a `community` publisher can **never** masquerade as `official`. This is the load-bearing
trust mechanism for the whole marketplace seam, and it's present day one.

**Forward-compat firewall:** an installed box that doesn't recognise a `type` or a
`payload.kind` **skips + logs** it (never errors). So the registry can publish new
types the day a newer client understands them, without breaking older installs.

### 8.2 The op vocabulary (`payload.kind:"ops"` — the hotfix body)

A **bounded, closed, declarative** set. **There is no `run-script`/`exec`/`shell` op,
ever** — a signed feed is an RCE channel *only if it can carry code*; this is the
supply-chain contract from §1. The payload file is `{ "schema":1, "ops":[ … ] }`. The
applier is a hardcoded dispatch `case`; an **unknown op name rejects the whole artifact at
validation, before any snapshot** (fail-closed, never a partial apply). Every op:

1. is **precondition-guarded** (checksum / `expect_current`) — it refuses (SKIP, recorded)
   on local drift rather than clobbering;
2. **two-tier reversible** — each op records a **pre-image into the History `undo` array**,
   so a clean op reverts *precisely* without a full restore; the snapshot (always taken) is
   the fallback for a dirty/un-invertible op, so even a buggy op can't make rollback wrong;
3. writes **only through the existing privilege funnels** — `runInstallOp`/`runFileOp`
   by tree (never raw `sudo`); `set-config-key` rides `updateConfigOption`, which already
   routes the write correctly per the de-sudo split.

**All-or-nothing**: the applier *dry-prechecks every op first*; if any precondition fails,
the whole artifact is **skipped untouched** (a first-class History entry, so coverage gaps
are visible — risk: a customised box may legitimately miss a fix). At most one
`dockerComposeUp` per app, after all ops.

| op | args | apply (existing fn) | undo | precondition |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| `set-config-key` | `key,value` | `updateConfigOption KEY VALUE` → `webuiGenerateSystemConfigs` | prior value (or delete if absent) | `key` matches `^CFG_[A-Z0-9_]+$`; opt. `expect_current` |
| `add-compose-label` / `remove-compose-label` | `app,service,label` | edit `containers/<app>/docker-compose.yml` via `runFileOp` | inverse op | service exists |
| `set-compose-image` | `app,service,image,from` | rewrite the `image:` line → `updaterComposePull` | restore `from` | current image == `from` (pin-a-broken-`latest`) |
| `set-compose-env` / `unset-compose-env` | `app,service,key,value` | upsert/remove env entry | restore prior | — |
| `patch-file-if-checksum-matches` | `path,expect_sha256,content_ref,result_sha256` | write new content **iff** current sha256 matches; assert post==result | captured bytes | **hard** sha256 match; allowlisted to `containers/<app>/`; install/WebUI tree **only** `trust:official` + `scope:system` |
| `set-data-file` | `path,url,sha256` | fetch + verify + drop a whole file | captured bytes | path-allowlisted; **the bridge to `bundle`** (a bundle = N of these) |
| `ensure-compose-up` / `restart-service` | `app` \| unit | `dockerComposeUp` / restart (allowlist: the `libreportal` unit, traefik) | no-op | — |

`set-compose-image` + `patch-file-if-checksum-matches` are the upstream-breakage killers
(§1). The checksum lock turns "patch a file" from an arbitrary write into a drift-safe,
conflict-detecting, reversible transform. `set-data-file` is deliberately the seam to the
future `bundle` applier — apps need a *new applier*, not new ops.

### 8.3 The PIPELINE (the verb) — `libreportal artifact apply <id>`

A generalization of `updaterApplyApp`, run **only as a task** (`cliTaskRun "libreportal
artifact apply <id>" "artifact_apply" "<app|->" ""`; the processor re-invokes with
`LIBREPORTAL_TASK_EXEC=1`). Seven steps — **six are type-agnostic; only step 4 dispatches
on `payload.kind`**:

0. **RESOLVE** (read-only) — `lpFetchIndex` (cached), find the envelope by id, check
   `applies_when` + `lpVersionGt` + `max_footprint <= lpInstalledFootprintVersion`
   (reuse `fetch.sh`'s exact footprint guard). Gate fails → History `skipped` + reason.
1. **FETCH** — `_lpDownload "$base/$channel/$payload.url"`.
2. **VERIFY** — `_lpSha256` == `payload.sha256`, then `lpVerifyMinisig` against the
   per-artifact `payload.sig`. (Two-tier: footprint key signs the index; the index
   pins each payload's hash + sig.)
3. **SNAPSHOT** — `libreportal backup app <app>` (the Backup engine) — the reversibility
   anchor that makes auto-apply defensible.
4. **APPLY** — `kind:"ops"` → the §8.2 interpreter; `kind:"bundle"` → drop+scan/regen
   (Phase 4). **Only this step knows the type.**
5. **VERIFY** — app healthy / container up (reuse the updater's post-check).
6. **AUTO-ROLLBACK on failure** — `updaterRollbackApp <app> auto` (restore the snapshot).
7. **HISTORY** — `updaterRecordHistory` (extended with `artifact_id`, `serial`) → the
   existing History tab. **Nothing silent.**

### 8.4 The marketplace seam

**Unchanged forever** (built once, reused): the index file + location + bash-native
parser; the whole envelope shape; pipeline steps 0–3,5–7; the two-tier trust chain;
mutations-via-tasks; the `valid_until`/`index_serial` guarantees. Adding apps/themes/
components is **purely additive**:

- a new `type` value becomes "handled" in step 4's dispatch (old boxes skip+log — §8.1 firewall);
- those types use `payload.kind:"bundle"` (a signed tarball) + one new bundle handler;
- a **custom source ("tap")** is just a second `(base_url, pubkey)` pair appended to a
  list — zero envelope change, the registry opens without us hosting or gatekeeping.

This is exactly the §3 "registry, not marketplace" shape, now expressed in the format.

### 8.5 Fork resolutions (was §6)

1. **Hotfix scope** → **config/compose ops + checksum-pinned file patches; NO code
   execution.** `patch-file-if-checksum-matches` is allowlisted to `containers/<app>/` +
   `configs/` and is drift-safe + reversible. **Our own install tree (WebUI/CLI code) is
   off-limits to hotfixes** — it already has a signed, whole-tree-verified delivery channel
   (releases + `SHA256SUMS` + `verify.sh`); letting a hotfix mutate it would open a second,
   finer-grained code-injection surface that bypasses the whole-tree signature. Code fixes
   ride an edge/out-of-band release. The killer use case (upstream breakage) is 100%
   config/compose, so this loses nothing real.
2. **Auto-apply policy** → **severity-split, declarative in the envelope** (`severity` +
   `auto`). `security`/`breakage` → auto-apply ON by default (defensible because the
   snapshot/auto-rollback safety net exists); `compat` → surface + one-click; `tweak` →
   manual unless opted into "auto-improve". A `CFG_HOTFIX_AUTO` toggle
   (`security-breakage` default / `all` / `off`) lets the operator tune it; `reversible:false`
   always forces a confirm. Blast radius is bounded by per-box snapshot/rollback **plus**
   staged rollout (edge before stable), a randomized apply delay, and recall via
   `supersedes` (a superseding revert).
3. **Hotfix locality** → **both.** `applies_when.app` makes an artifact app-scoped (it also
   surfaces on that app's page); a null app is system-wide. One field, both behaviours.
4. **Third-party — yet?** → **first-party only now, registry-ready by design.** The index
   ships with one publisher (`libreportal`, role `official`) and one source — no tap UI,
   accounts, or moderation. But the `publishers` map + per-artifact `trust` are already in
   the envelope, so opening to community is *appending publisher entries / sources and
   flipping the trust-gate UI* — not a rebuild. `community`/`custom` tiers gate the riskiest
   ops (host-script hooks on `bundle` apps — §3.2).
5. **App catalog entry point** → **curated Browse-&-Add** (first-party definitions as the
   seed catalog), with bring-your-own-compose remaining the advanced/“custom source” path.

### 8.6 Trust & transparency (the non-negotiables, in the format)

- **Two-tier signatures** anchored on the **root-owned footprint key** (`/usr/local/lib/
  libreportal/libreportal.pub`) — the manager can't swap it, so it can't bless a forgery.
  Tier 1: the footprint key signs the **index** (incl. the `publishers` map). Tier 2: each
  artifact's signature is checked against *its publisher's key from that signed map*, and
  the claimed `trust` is honored only if the publisher's `role` allows it. A forged inline
  key can't self-certify — the trust comes from the team-signed map, not from the artifact.
- **Canonical bytes** — sign/verify the **exact bytes between the artifact's braces** (sig
  field excluded); never re-serialize the JSON on the box (a re-serialization mismatch would
  silently break every signature). One rule, no ambiguity.
- **`valid_until`** — a signed feed that simply *stops advancing* is the silent-withholding
  / targeting attack; a stale index is **refused**, not treated as "no updates". Same spirit
  as the [warrant canary](../../) (freshness = signal); ideally the fortnightly canary
  **countersigns the current `index_serial`** so a frozen feed is provable, not just absent.
- **`index_serial`** — monotonic; a lower serial than we've accepted is a rollback attack →
  refused. The high-water mark is recorded locally (a dedicated `.index_serial` file, *not*
  derived from History — so the anti-rollback guard never depends on History's jq path) and
  never lowered by a refused fetch.
- **Public + identical for everyone** — one signed feed; a targeted hotfix to a single
  victim is impossible to send without it being publicly visible.
- **Nothing silent** — every apply lands in **History** with what / why / revert. ⚠️ This
  guarantee currently has a hole: `updaterRecordHistory` (`cli_updater_commands.sh:154-168`)
  does `command -v jq || return 0` — it *silently skips* the audit entry when jq is absent.
  Phase 2 must make it **fail-closed with a bash-native fallback** before any hotfix applies.

### 8.7 Build phases & status

- ✅ **Phase 1 — the signed-fetch + verify read primitive (BUILT 2026-05-31).**
  - `lpVerifyMinisig` factored out of `lpFetchRelease` (`scripts/source/fetch.sh`) — the
    single trust anchor now shared by releases *and* the index; `lpFetchRelease` refactored
    to use it (no behaviour change).
  - `scripts/source/artifacts.sh`: `lpFetchIndex` (download → **verify-before-parse** →
    `valid_until` freshness → `index_serial` anti-rollback high-water → emit verified JSON),
    plus parsing accessors (jq when present, grep fallback; the trust core is jq-free).
  - `libreportal artifact index` (`scripts/cli/commands/artifact/`) — read-only front door
    that fetches + verifies + lists. Runs directly (no mutation), like `updater check`.
  - Self-tested: trust core fails closed (real key + no minisign → refuse), happy path,
    stale-refused, rollback-refused, signature-refused, jq + grep parsing — 12/12.
- ⬜ **Phase 2 — the ops applier + apply verb (the heart, *next*).** `artifactApply`
  (steps 0–9) + `artifactApplyOps` (the §8.2 vocabulary with dry-precheck-all + per-op
  `undo[]`), the **publishers-map two-tier sig check + canonical-envelope verification**,
  snapshot → apply → verify → auto-rollback → History, wired as `artifact_apply` /
  `artifact_revert` tasks. Reuse `updateConfigOption` / `dockerComposeUp` /
  `updaterComposePull` / `backup app` / `updaterRollbackApp` verbatim. Extend `history.json`
  (`artifact_id`, `serial`, `undo`) **and fix the `updaterRecordHistory` jq-silent-skip
  (fail-closed + bash-native fallback)** — the "nothing silent" guarantee depends on it.
  Makes the Vaultwarden killer use case real, first-party.
- ⬜ **Phase 3 — auto-apply policy.** `CFG_HOTFIX_AUTO`, the periodic-check auto-apply of
  `security`/`breakage` (queue `compat`/`tweak` as suggestions), staged rollout + delay.
- ⬜ **Phase 4 — WebUI "Updates & Improvements".** Extend `webuiUpdaterScan` to fetch +
  verify the index into a **temp then atomically write** `artifacts_available.json` (never
  emit broken JSON; keep the prior file on failure) — **no second phone-home**. Add the
  Hotfixes/Improvements stream (why / severity / source, one-click revert, per-app chip).
  *User-visible → verify with `lp-shot` on the updater route before calling it done.*
- ⬜ **Phase 5 — publisher tooling.** `make_hotfix.sh` (sibling of `make_release.sh`) emits
  a payload + sha256 + minisig + the index entry, then re-signs the index bumping
  `index_serial`. The piece that lets a maintainer actually ship one.
- ⬜ **Deferred (registry; additive, demand-gated).** `payload.kind:"bundle"` applier (verify
  tarball → extract into the app tree → scan/regen) + `type:"app"|"theme"|"component"` +
  the `app_add` task + community trust-tier **host-script quarantine** (§3.2) + multi-source
  "tap" UX + the warrant-canary countersigning `index_serial`.