librelad a27304a191 fix(distribution): harden the artifact apply pipeline (adversarial review)
A 4-lens adversarial security review of the Phase 2 applier raised 19 issues
and confirmed 17 after per-finding verification. All are trust-boundary (they
require the signing key), but several break the explicit "no code-exec, always
reversible, nothing-silent" contract, so all 17 are fixed:

Trust path — fail CLOSED, never misreport:
- lpFetchIndex now surfaces the real signature state (LP_INDEX_SIGSTATE);
  artifactApply REFUSES to mutate unless the index is actually verified, and
  _artifactFetchPayload refuses an unsigned payload. The read path still
  tolerates dev/unsigned but now says "UNSIGNED" instead of "Signed + verified".
- valid_until and index_serial are now MANDATORY + numeric in lpFetchIndex
  (missing = refuse) — closes the anti-withholding / anti-rollback fail-opens.

Injection / code-exec (defense in depth even for a signed payload):
- runFileWrite rootless branch no longer builds a `bash -c` shell string with the
  destination interpolated — it uses the argv form (like runFileOp), so a path
  with a quote can't inject a command as the install user. (shared-helper fix)
- op paths must match a safe-filename charset (no quotes/$/backtick/;/newline);
  set-config-key values and set-compose-image refs are charset-guarded too.
- content_b64 is validated as real base64 at precheck.

Reversibility / honest failure:
- dockerComposeUp now returns the real compose exit status (it always returned 0,
  so the updater's rollback gate AND the apply's start-failure detection were
  fail-open). (shared-helper fix)
- set-config-key undo captures the WHOLE config file (lossless) instead of a
  lossy re-parsed scalar; edit-only (rejects an absent key).
- _artifactReplayUndoFile returns non-zero if any inverse op fails; auto-rollback
  and revert now record "rollback-incomplete"/"revert-incomplete" + isError
  instead of falsely claiming success, and revert keeps the record for retry.
- applied-record write failure is checked — apply rolls back rather than leave an
  un-revertable change. System-scope regen failure is no longer swallowed.
- Writes are path-aware (configs/ -> runInstallWrite, container tree ->
  runFileWrite) so system-scope hotfixes write/restore correctly.
- Checked lazy-sourcing surfaces a clear error instead of a bare exit 127.

Unit-tested 35/35 (adds: command-sub value rejection, bad image-ref, invalid
base64, quote/metachar path-injection rejection, replay-failure reporting).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: librelad <librelad@digitalangels.vip>
2026-05-31 20:47:18 +01:00

133 lines
7.1 KiB
Bash

#!/bin/bash
#
# LibrePortal artifact-index helpers — the READ side of the unified distribution
# primitive (see docs/roadmap/updates-and-distribution.md).
#
# An "artifact" is anything LibrePortal pulls from the outside and applies
# reversibly: a HOTFIX today; apps / themes / components later. They all share
# ONE team-signed catalog — the INDEX — published in the SAME release tree as
# latest.json: $base/$channel/index.json (+ index.json.minisig).
#
# This file is PHASE 1 of that primitive: fetch + verify + parse the index. It
# performs NO mutation. The apply pipeline (snapshot → declarative ops → verify →
# auto-rollback → History) is Phase 2 (scripts/cli/commands/artifact). Keeping
# the read side here means the trust core is testable on its own and the WebUI
# scan can surface "available artifacts" before any apply machinery exists.
#
# Trust chain — fail-closed at every step once the footprint key is real:
# footprint pubkey --signs--> index.json --lists--> per-artifact {sha256, sig}
# Verification reuses lpVerifyMinisig (fetch.sh) — the EXACT anchor the release
# fetch uses — so the manager can't bless a forged catalog any more than a forged
# release. Two transparency guarantees, both jq-free so the trust core never
# depends on jq being present:
# valid_until — refuse a stale/withheld feed. A signed feed that simply stops
# advancing is the silent-withholding / targeting attack the
# warrant-canary model exists to defeat; treat a frozen feed as
# a signal, not as "no updates".
# index_serial — monotonic counter; refuse a serial below the highest we have
# already accepted (a rollback that re-introduces a pulled or
# again-vulnerable entry).
# The index sits next to latest.json on the same channel; reuse those resolvers
# (lpReleaseBaseUrl/lpReleaseChannel live in fetch.sh).
lpArtifactIndexUrl() { echo "$(lpReleaseBaseUrl)/$(lpReleaseChannel)/index.json"; }
# Runtime-owned high-water mark for index_serial (the anti-rollback anchor). It
# lives alongside the other generated updater data so it ships/clears with that
# state; the dir is in the container tree, so writes go through the container
# funnel. Reads are fine as any user (world-readable).
lpArtifactSerialFile() { echo "${containers_dir%/}/libreportal/frontend/data/updater/generated/.index_serial"; }
lpArtifactLastSerial() { local v; v=$(cat "$(lpArtifactSerialFile)" 2>/dev/null | tr -dc '0-9'); echo "${v:-0}"; }
lpArtifactRecordSerial() {
local serial="$1" f; f="$(lpArtifactSerialFile)"
[[ "$serial" =~ ^[0-9]+$ ]] || return 0
runFileOp mkdir -p "$(dirname "$f")" 2>/dev/null || true
printf '%s\n' "$serial" | runFileWrite "$f"
}
# Fetch + verify the signed artifact index.
# $1 (optional): also cache the verified JSON to this path (for the WebUI scan).
# Echoes the verified JSON to stdout on success. Returns non-zero (printing
# nothing usable) on ANY download / signature / freshness / rollback failure —
# callers MUST NOT proceed on a non-zero return (fail-closed).
# On success, sets the global LP_INDEX_SIGSTATE to "verified" or "unsigned" so
# callers can distinguish a real signature from signing-not-activated (dev). The
# READ path tolerates "unsigned" (dev/git installs); the MUTATING apply path must
# refuse it (see artifactApply) — that asymmetry is the whole point of surfacing it.
LP_INDEX_SIGSTATE=""
lpFetchIndex() {
local cache="${1:-}" base channel tmp idx sig json valid_until nowts serial last
base="$(lpReleaseBaseUrl)"; channel="$(lpReleaseChannel)"
LP_INDEX_SIGSTATE=""
[[ -n "$(_lpFetchTool)" ]] || { isError "lpFetchIndex: need curl or wget"; return 1; }
tmp="$(mktemp -d)"; idx="$tmp/index.json"; sig="$tmp/index.json.minisig"
# Silence the downloader's own stderr (curl's "could not resolve host" / 404
# noise) — the caller's clean error message covers the failure. Consistent
# with the .minisig fetch below.
if ! _lpDownload "$base/$channel/index.json" "$idx" 2>/dev/null; then
isError "lpFetchIndex: could not download the artifact index"; rm -rf "$tmp"; return 1
fi
# Signature FIRST — never parse an unverified document to make trust
# decisions. Fetch the .minisig best-effort; lpVerifyMinisig decides whether
# a missing/invalid signature is fatal (it is, once the key is real) and
# echoes the resulting state, which we record for the apply-path gate.
_lpDownload "$base/$channel/index.json.minisig" "$sig" 2>/dev/null || true
LP_INDEX_SIGSTATE="$(lpVerifyMinisig "$idx" "$sig")" || { rm -rf "$tmp"; return 1; }
json="$(cat "$idx")"
# Freshness — a valid index MUST carry a future valid_until. Missing / non-
# numeric / elapsed all refuse (a withheld or undated feed is the attack the
# anti-withholding guarantee exists to defeat — fail-closed, not fail-open).
valid_until="$(_lpJsonNum "$json" valid_until)"
nowts="$(date +%s 2>/dev/null)"
if [[ -z "$valid_until" ]]; then
isError "lpFetchIndex: index has no numeric valid_until — refusing (anti-withholding)"; rm -rf "$tmp"; return 1
fi
if [[ -n "$nowts" ]] && (( valid_until < nowts )); then
isError "lpFetchIndex: artifact index is stale (valid_until elapsed) — refusing"; rm -rf "$tmp"; return 1
fi
# Anti-rollback — a valid index MUST carry index_serial, and it must not go
# backwards from the highest accepted (missing serial = missing anchor = refuse).
serial="$(_lpJsonNum "$json" index_serial)"
if [[ -z "$serial" ]]; then
isError "lpFetchIndex: index has no numeric index_serial — refusing (anti-rollback anchor missing)"; rm -rf "$tmp"; return 1
fi
last="$(lpArtifactLastSerial)"
if (( serial < last )); then
isError "lpFetchIndex: index_serial $serial below last-seen $last (rollback) — refusing"; rm -rf "$tmp"; return 1
fi
lpArtifactRecordSerial "$serial"
[[ -n "$cache" ]] && printf '%s' "$json" | runFileWrite "$cache"
printf '%s' "$json"
rm -rf "$tmp"
return 0
}
# --- Parsing accessors -------------------------------------------------------
# The trust-critical fields (index_serial / valid_until / signature) are read
# jq-free above so the security core has no jq dependency. Enumerating the
# artifacts ARRAY for display is best-effort: jq when present (the runtime path
# has it — updaterRecordHistory already relies on it), with a flat grep fallback.
lpIndexTop() { _lpJsonStr "$2" "$1"; } # lpIndexTop <field> <json> -> top-level scalar
lpIndexArtifactIds() { # echo one artifact id per line
local json="$1"
if command -v jq >/dev/null 2>&1; then
printf '%s' "$json" | jq -r '.artifacts[]?.id // empty' 2>/dev/null
return 0
fi
printf '%s' "$json" | grep -oE '"id"[[:space:]]*:[[:space:]]*"[^"]*"' | sed -E 's/.*"([^"]*)"$/\1/'
}
lpArtifactById() { # lpArtifactById <json> <id> -> the artifact object (jq only)
local json="$1" id="$2"
command -v jq >/dev/null 2>&1 || return 1
printf '%s' "$json" | jq -ce --arg id "$id" '.artifacts[]? | select(.id==$id)' 2>/dev/null
}