Root-run command to move the system and/or containers root to another
disk after install, re-baking everything that carries those paths: the
nine root-owned helpers, the CLI wrapper, the systemd unit and the
WebUI's own compose bind-mounts.
Deliberately NOT in the manager's scoped sudoers, and symlinked into PATH
like the uninstaller. Moving a root re-bakes the very helpers the sudoers
allowlist trusts, so a helper that did it from a caller-supplied path
would hand the manager the entire trust boundary those helpers exist to
defend. A human with real root runs this; the WebUI can only print the
command, which is what the Storage step now does.
Copy-verify-then-leave, never move: the source tree is not removed at all
— the command tells you to delete it once you have confirmed the WebUI
works. An interrupted run therefore leaves a working install behind
rather than half of one, and the pre-relocation copies of every
root-owned file are kept under $lp_lib_dir/.relocate-<timestamp>/.
Admission mirrors libreportal-storage: absolute, no "..", not a protected
system path, not already in use, must be an empty directory, roots must
not nest, and space checked with 10% headroom.
One bug worth recording, caught on the first test run against a live
install: _validate_target was called inside $(...), and `die` runs `exit`
— which inside a command substitution kills only the subshell. Every
refusal silently became "proceed" and the relocation ran. No damage (the
copy steps were guarded on a now-empty variable, so the re-bake wrote
identical values and only the service bounced), but it is exactly the
difference between a refusal and an unintended relocation. It now sets a
global and returns, so `die` exits the script it is meant to.
footprint_version -> 7 for the new root-owned executable.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The Storage step was a technical dump: every check's full sentence
concatenated onto the card, so the fstab line the user is meant to act on
was buried in prose nobody reads.
The card now shows plain facts and at most two short flags — "Low on
space · Won't be mounted after a reboot" — with everything else behind a
Details button. The modal carries the technical spec (device, UUID, mount
options, removable), every check with its full explanation, and the
fstab offer.
That needed the shell to stop joining checks into one string: the
generator emits a record per check, plus the fstab line as its own field,
so neither the card nor the modal has to parse anything back out of the
other.
The screenshot caught a bug this restructure introduced: summaries keyed
on check id alone, so a PASSING check printed the failure wording next to
a green tick — "This drive's format can't store file ownership" above
"Filesystem: ext4". Now severity-aware.
On writing /etc/fstab — §1 ruled it out and §6.3 now records why that
reverses. The warning is useless to the audience this is for: "add this
line to fstab" assumes SSH, root, an editor, and knowing what fstab is,
and the likely outcome is a reboot where nothing starts. What makes it
defensible is nofail + x-systemd.device-timeout, which mean a missing
device can never block boot — without that pair it would stay a non-goal,
because the failure being risked (an unbootable machine) is worse than
the one being fixed.
Enforced in the root helper: UUID never /dev/sdX, append inside a marked
block, refuse a target or UUID already described, refuse the root
filesystem, require a live mount, timestamped backup, and
`findmnt --verify` before the file is installed — a file that doesn't
parse never reaches /etc. Opt-in only.
Verified against a real filesystem: entry added and verifies, the
persistence warning then disappears on the next scan, and duplicate /
root-fs / non-mountpoint / relative are each refused with the reason.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Restore built its restic include filter from THIS host's containers root:
engineRestoreSnapshot "$idx" "$id" "/" "$containers_dir$app"
restic reproduces a snapshot's absolute paths, so that only works when
both sides agree byte-for-byte. LibrePortal has shipped configurable
roots for a while, so restoring a snapshot taken on a host installed with
--containers-dir=/mnt/ssd/apps onto a default host matched no include
path and restored NOTHING — with no error, because an include filter that
matches nothing is not a failure. Storage locations turn that from a rare
cross-host case into an ordinary one.
storageSnapshotSourcePath asks the repository where the app actually
lived. storageRestoreAppTo restores in place when that agrees with where
the app belongs here, and stages-then-moves when it does not — which is
also what makes "restore this app onto a different disk" possible at all.
Both restore_app_start.sh and resticRestoreAppLatest go through it, and
both fall back to the old behaviour when a snapshot does not report its
paths, so older snapshots restore exactly as before.
The move into place runs as root (app-adopt) for the same reason app-move
does: a restored tree carries container sub-UIDs the manager cannot
recreate. Staging is constrained to the restore/migrate area and the
destination is validated against the root-owned registry, so neither end
is taken on trust from the caller.
The manifest now records where an app lived — location name, path and fs
uuid. The name is what travels, since a path means nothing on the other
host; the rest is for diagnostics and for answering "is this the same
disk?" during a migrate.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Phase 2 and 4 of docs/roadmap/storage-locations.md. Apps can now be
placed on a location and moved between them.
CFG_<APP>_STORAGE lands in all 37 app templates, holding a location NAME
rather than a path: names survive a migrate to a host with different
disks, paths do not. The 11 infrastructure apps that other apps reach by
literal path (traefik, prometheus, grafana, adguard, gluetun, crowdsec,
headscale, dashy, pihole, unbound, wireguard) are pinned. libreportal
itself never gets the key — it is pinned structurally by webuiDir.
Pinning needed no second config key. "Pinned" is not a fact about a value,
it is a statement about whether the field may be edited, so it goes in the
comment beside **ADVANCED** and **DEV** as **READONLY**, and the field
factory renders those disabled. That marker earns its keep beyond this
feature: derived fields already warned in prose that editing them does
nothing (crowdsec.config:72) next to a perfectly editable input.
storage_app_config.sh keeps the comment honest — it carries the resolved
path for hand-recovery and regenerates the dropdown from the registry, but
only writes when something actually changed, since the app .config is
user-editable and lives in the container-owned tree.
app move stops the app (a live copy of a running Postgres is a corrupt
copy), snapshots it, copies, verifies, and only then removes the source.
The copy runs in libreportal-ownership because it must: app data holds
rootless sub-UID files the manager can neither read nor recreate.
Verified against two real ext4 filesystems that a cross-device move
preserves uid 231141 and the payload, and that the source survives every
refusal path — unregistered destination, the WebUI app, a traversal in the
app name, and an occupied destination.
Task titles registered in both tables, with a specific rule so a move
renders as "Nextcloud - Move to bigdisk" rather than the generic fallback
dropping the destination. lp-task-names could not be run to confirm — it
borrows the WebUI container's node and no containers are running.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Follow-up to 928e244, which stopped configs/ subdirectories being sourced
without a .category marker. That closed the hole; this removes the thing
that fell into it.
storageIndexFile pointed at configs/storage/app_locations. The file's
requirements are only "manager-owned" and "not on a removable disk" —
configs/ satisfies both, which is why I put it there, and it was still
wrong: that tree carries a third property the file violates. sourceScanFiles
SOURCES what it finds under configs/, and sourcing means executing.
The index is a TSV of "<slug><TAB><root>", which bash reads as a command
and its argument. Harmless while no slug matched a real executable. The
row for the app named `libreportal` armed it, because that IS the CLI on
PATH: sourcing ran `libreportal /libreportal-containers`, which re-entered
the scan, which sourced the file again — one process pair per level until
the host OOMed and took the desktop session with it.
It now lives at $system_dir/storage/app_locations, with a one-shot
migration so an install that already has an index keeps knowing where its
apps live rather than silently forgetting. libreportal-ownership
reconciles the new directory, and scan_files.sh gained a note that
configs/storage/ carries no .category on purpose.
scripts/dev/lp-configs-guard-test covers both ends: the index never lands
in configs/, a legacy one migrates, and a file of the exact detonating
shape placed in an unmarked configs/ subdirectory is not executed while a
marked category still loads.
Also wires sourceStorageLocations into the config scan beside
sourceBackupLocations — per-location configs sit at depth 3, below the
generic scan, and need their own walker like the backup ones do.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Running any tool jumped to the Tasks tab and left the user stranded there. That
is right for an install — long, log-heavy, worth watching — and wrong for a
tool, which is a short admin action whose answer is one line. Worse, half of
these are only meaningful back on Tools: List Users opens a modal over that tab,
and Create User Account returns a generated password that was being buried in a
log the user then had to go read.
Tools now stay put. On completion the tool's own outcome lines — the
isSuccessful/isError/isNotice output, ANSI stripped and framework boilerplate
filtered — are shown in a small result modal, with a View log button for
anything needing the full detail. list_users is left alone because the existing
account-list modal is already a better result view.
Also stops generate_arrays.sh walking scripts/dev. That directory is
`export-ignore`d, so it exists in a working clone but never in a shipped
install; generating a files_dev.sh entry from it wrote a reference into
files_source.sh that no install could satisfy, and the loader treats a missing
array file as a broken installation — every libreportal command stopped with
"files_dev.sh is missing from your LibrePortal Installation". Excluded alongside
unused/, system/ and release/. Regenerating also picked up scripts/validation,
which had never had an array file.
And Matrix's account listing prints its aligned line from python rather than
re-splitting the marker line in bash: TAB is IFS whitespace, so an empty display
name collapsed into the previous delimiter and shifted every later column.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The rootless WebUI container reads its bind-mount sources (configs/webui/*)
through the container-owner GROUP since a2376e2 switched those files from
world-readable to 0640 group=container-owner. But the WebUI credential
randomizer rewrites webui_logins via `sed -i` as the non-root manager, which
recreates the file with the manager's own group — dropping the container-owner
group. The installer then started the container immediately, so node hit
EACCES on /app/webui_logins at require-time (parseConfigFile) and exited 1;
nothing listened on the WebUI port. `libreportal webui login reset` had the
same latent bug (rewrite → restart). Under the old world-readable model a
post-sed file stayed o+r so the container could still read it, which is why
this only surfaced on fresh rootless installs after a2376e2.
Fix: make reconcileWebuiDirOwnership the single "ready the WebUI for its
container" pass — it now also restores the configs/webui bind access (new
`webui-bind` ownership action) on top of the container-dir chown. Reorder the
installer so the credential randomizer runs BEFORE the before-start permission
pass, making that pass the last ownership touch before the container starts;
and call reconcileWebuiDirOwnership before the restart in login reset.
Live box recovered via `libreportal-ownership reconcile`; WebUI 200.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: librelad <librelad@digitalangels.vip>
_webui_bind_access granted o+r to every file in configs/webui so the
rootless container could read its bind-mount sources — but that also made
secrets like webui_logins world-readable to any local user. Under rootless
the container's gid 0 maps to the container owner's gid, so group access is
sufficient: chown the webui dir + files to MANAGER:container-owner, dir
0751 (traverse, not list), files 0640. Container reads via group; other
local users get nothing; the manager (owner) still rewrites them.
Verified live: container READ ok, world READ denied, manager rw, WebUI
login still 200. Live helper updated in lockstep with this source.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: librelad <librelad@digitalangels.vip>
The task processor is a systemd-service daemon, not a cron job — move it out
of the misleadingly-named scripts/crontab/task/ to scripts/task/.
To stop the systemd unit from baking the processor's in-tree path (the footprint
coupling that forces a reinstall on every reorg), the unit now ExecStarts the
stable wrapper: /usr/local/bin/libreportal __task-processor. start.sh intercepts
that early (after paths.sh, before the heavy load), exports install_scripts_dir,
and exec's the processor with start_script. Future moves/renames need only the
one hand-off updated + a regen — no footprint bump.
- git mv scripts/crontab/task -> scripts/task (filenames kept; cron-watchdog grep
+ function names unchanged)
- libreportal-svc: ExecStart -> stable wrapper launcher
- start.sh: __task-processor internal launcher (export install_scripts_dir; exec)
- crontab_task_processor.sh: fix self-location ../.. -> .. for the new 1-level
depth (latent bug the move would otherwise have introduced)
- regen files_*/function_manifest; add task_scripts to the app/cli aggregates
- footprint_version 3 -> 4 (root-owned svc unit changed -> needs a root reinstall)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: librelad <librelad@digitalangels.vip>
- docs: remove the docs/README.md index and docs/CONTRIBUTING.md pointer
(duplicate filenames); the canonical contributing guide stays at
docs/contributing/contributing.md. Clean tree, no name collisions.
- scripts/system/*: 6 helper headers + host_access.sh said the helpers
install to /usr/local/sbin, but init.sh installs all of them to
/usr/local/lib/libreportal/ (verified via initRootHelpers + the sudoers
Cmnd_Alias). Corrected. The only remaining /usr/local/sbin is the legit
PATH export in the task processor.
- frontend kernel: drop migration-era comments that are now false post-
modularization (feature-registry 'passive/phase 0/unused', lifecycle
'ctx.services lands with Phase 2', manifest 'scan generator lands') —
describe current behaviour instead.
Comment-only edits to scripts/system/* — no footprint_version bump (no
behavioural change; bumping would force needless reinstalls).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: librelad <librelad@digitalangels.vip>
dockerDeleteData (uninstall) and the wipe-before-restore step in
restoreAppStart both did `runFileOp rm -rf $containers_dir$app_name`,
which runs as $CFG_DOCKER_INSTALL_USER (dockerinstall, uid 1002 on
rootless). That user owns app-template files but CANNOT remove
container sub-UID dirs created by the daemon's userns mapping —
postgres data at uid 232070, nextcloud html at uid 33, etc. The rm
therefore silently failed with
rm: cannot remove '/libreportal-containers/invidious/postgresdata':
Permission denied
while still reporting "<app> successfully uninstalled" — leaving the
sub-UID directory tree on disk to confuse the next install and leak
storage.
Fix: route the wipe through a new `app-data-remove` action in the
root-owned libreportal-ownership helper. Root can rm sub-UID files
unconditionally. The helper validates the app name (alphanumeric +
. _ -, no traversal), refuses the WebUI's own slot (libreportal), and
is idempotent when the dir is already gone.
Two callers updated:
- scripts/docker/app/uninstall/delete_data.sh
- scripts/restore/restore_app_start.sh
The helper itself ships root-owned at /usr/local/lib/libreportal/, so a
fresh install or release upgrade is needed to pick up the new action.
Bumped init.sh footprint_version 2 → 3 so the runtime updater
prompts a root re-install on the next release.
Signed-off-by: librelad <librelad@digitalangels.vip>
CrowdSec's host-side install (the agent + nftables bouncer the LibrePortal
Traefik plugin talks to) had stayed on blanket sudo throughout the rootless +
de-sudo hardening: `sudo apt-get install crowdsec`, `curl | sudo bash`,
`sudo sed -i /etc/crowdsec/config.yaml`, `sudo touch + sudo chmod /var/log/
crowdsec*.log`, `echo $key | sudo tee /etc/crowdsec/traefik_bouncer.key`,
plus `sudo cscli capi register / console enroll / bouncers add`. None of
those are in the scoped LP_HELPERS / LP_SYSTEM sudoers grant the manager
now holds, so any user who enabled crowdsec would have hit hard sudo
failures on every privileged step.
Follow the libreportal-appcfg / libreportal-bininstall pattern: one new
root-owned helper at /usr/local/lib/libreportal/libreportal-crowdsec
that does every privileged op behind a fixed action vocabulary with strict
argument validation. The manager calls in via runCrowdsec — the scoped
sudoers grants exactly one binary, the same trust boundary the other
helpers rely on.
Actions:
install apt repo + agent + firewall-bouncer + enable +
crowdsecurity/{linux,sshd} collections + reload
(idempotent — skips parts already in place)
services <verb> enable | disable | restart
capi <verb> register | unregister | status
console <verb> enroll <token> | disenroll | status
token format strictly validated
bouncer-traefik-init cscli register + write the manager-owned key file
atomically (returns EXISTS or GENERATED:<key>)
bouncer-priority bouncer yaml nftables priority → -100
(moved from libreportal-appcfg; one helper for
every crowdsec root op)
bind-lapi flip listen_uri to 0.0.0.0:8080 in config.yaml
prometheus <on…|off> flip the prometheus block (validated addr/port)
touch-host-logs create + chmod 0644 /var/log/crowdsec*.log so the
libreportal container can tail them
Wired in via:
- new sudoers Cmnd_Alias entry for the helper in LP_HELPERS
- new helper baked alongside the others by initRootHelpers
(replaces __SYSTEM_DIR__ / __CONTAINERS_DIR__ / __MANAGER__ at
install, with safe runtime fallbacks if unbaked)
- new runCrowdsec dispatch in scripts/docker/command/run_privileged.sh
containers/crowdsec/scripts/crowdsec_install_host.sh now drives the whole
flow through runCrowdsec — every `sudo …` is gone, the compose-toggle sed
uses runFileOp, and the security_crowdsec CFG mirror uses runInstallOp
(configs/ is manager-owned). Net: install script shrinks ~80 lines while
gaining a single auditable trust boundary. crowdsec_fix_priority.sh swung
over to runCrowdsec bouncer-priority too — the appcfg crowdsec_priority
action drops out cleanly.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: librelad <librelad@digitalangels.vip>
The standalone WireGuard install used to flip net.ipv4.ip_forward by
appending+uncommenting `/etc/sysctl/99-custom.conf` via blanket sudo
(sudo tee, sudo sed, sudo sysctl -p). Two problems with that on a
de-sudoed manager:
- The path is non-standard. The conventional location is
/etc/sysctl.d/*.conf (drop-ins, loaded by sysctl --system) — the
old file may not even exist, leaving forwarding silently off.
- `sudo tee /etc` and `sudo sed -i /etc` are not in LP_SYSTEM. The
manager has lost the broad sudo it once had, so this would now
fail outright on every wireguard install.
Add a `wireguard-ip-forward` action to libreportal-appcfg that:
- writes /etc/sysctl.d/99-libreportal-wireguard.conf (a drop-in we
own and rewrite idempotently), and
- reloads via `sysctl --system` (with a `sysctl -p <dropin>` fallback).
containers/wireguard/wireguard.sh now calls `runAppCfg wireguard-ip-forward`
through the existing helper-dispatch path — the whole edit runs as root
in one validated step, no `sudo` in the per-app script.
Same de-sudo pattern as adguard-auth / crowdsec-priority / owncloud-config
already use.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: librelad <librelad@digitalangels.vip>
The rename was justified partly by an anticipated second `libreportal-regen`
unit — which we then decided not to create (the poll rides the existing task
processor). What's left is cosmetic, and it isn't worth a footprint_version bump
(which forces a root re-install on every existing box) plus the dual-name
migration cruft.
Reverting also means the rename was the ONLY footprint change in the regen work,
so the whole regen system now ships as a plain manager-owned code deploy — no
root re-install needed. footprint_version stays 2.
Kept only the accurate FOOTPRINT.md note that the service also drives the poll.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: librelad <librelad@digitalangels.vip>
The single systemd unit is the task processor (and now also drives the periodic
regen poll), so name it for what it does instead of the ambiguous bare
"libreportal.service" — clearer now that the runtime has more than one concern.
- svc helper: SERVICE_NAME=libreportal-taskprocessor.service; _drop_legacy()
stops/removes the pre-rename unit on install (idempotent migration) so an
upgraded box never runs two processors.
- init.sh: read baked roots from the new unit (fall back to the old name);
uninstall removes both names; bump footprint_version 2 -> 3 (root-owned unit
changed, so a manager-run update flags "root re-install needed").
- check_webui_systemd: accept either name during the transition.
- docs/FOOTPRINT.md: new unit name + uninstall command.
No sudoers change — it allows /usr/bin/systemctl generically, not a named unit.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: librelad <librelad@digitalangels.vip>
sudo_user_name (the real manager — owns the install, runs the runtime, baked as
__MANAGER__ into the root helpers) was hardcoded to 'libreportal'. Make it
configurable, consistent with the relocatable roots:
- --manager-user=NAME flag + LP_MANAGER_USER env (default libreportal); resolved
early in init.sh and in scripts/source/paths.sh (so the standalone processors
get it too), validated as a real Linux username in libreportalValidatePaths.
- Baked everywhere it must be stable: the helpers + CLI wrapper (CHECK_USER now
__MANAGER__, exports LP_MANAGER_USER) via the install-time sed; the systemd unit
exports LP_MANAGER_USER=<manager>. User creation (initUsers), the sudoers
drop-in, and ~35 call sites already used $sudo_user_name, so they follow.
- Fix the stray manager-name literals: install_crowdsec.sh chown, the
check_install_type fallback. (Brand/identity strings like the backup
engine:libreportal tag are left — they're not the username.)
Verified: resolves default/env/flag; wrapper bakes a custom name (admin) with no
placeholders left; validation rejects invalid usernames. The footprint paths
(/etc, /usr/local) stay fixed by design.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: librelad <librelad@digitalangels.vip>
Split the single tree into three owner-isolated roots and fix the backup
permission failure (restic, running as the container user, could not write the
manager-owned /docker/backups).
Ownership helper (libreportal-ownership), rewritten for three baked roots:
SYSTEM_DIR (manager) CONTAINERS_DIR + BACKUPS_DIR (container user)
- reconcile now drives each tree to its single owner; backups + the WebUI dir go
to the container user (the actual fix). The container user reaches only the
WebUI bind-mount sources (configs/webui/*) via a scoped _webui_bind_access —
traverse the system root + configs, read configs/webui only, nothing else.
- defence-in-depth: refuse dangerous/relative roots even if mis-baked; new
backups-top action.
Baking: init.sh initRootHelpers now seds __SYSTEM_DIR__/__CONTAINERS_DIR__/
__BACKUPS_DIR__ (alongside __MANAGER__) into every helper at install — the trust
boundary stays root-controlled. svc/socket/appcfg helpers updated to derive from
the baked SYSTEM_DIR; the svc unit now exports LP_*_DIR so the processor resolves
roots authoritatively. A baking-safe '*"__"*' sentinel check survives the sed.
Install/uninstall: initFolders creates the three roots; initContainerLayer hands
containers + backups to the container user; uninstall removes all three
(idempotent on legacy single-tree installs). Remaining functional /docker
literals in init.sh (config reads, setupConfigsFromRepo, uninstall) parameterised.
Compose: the WebUI's two relative ../../configs mounts (the only cross-tree
relative mounts in the tree) are now absolute, filled at generation via a new
CONFIGS_DIR_TAG; CONTAINERS_DIR_TAG likewise for the LP_CONTAINERS_DIR env.
Live box unaffected: installed helpers + the live compose only change on reinstall/
rebuild (both of which fill the tags); the CLI-wrapper heredoc paths are baked in
phase 3.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: librelad <librelad@digitalangels.vip>
Bring the remaining deferred subsystems under the scoped sudoers, and drop
the one that's redundant.
Backup engines + app configs -> root-owned helpers (same pattern as
ownership/dns/ssh/socket/svc):
- scripts/system/libreportal-bininstall: install <restic|kopia> — does the
whole pkg-manager/signed-download install itself for a fixed, validated
engine name (no blanket sudo apt-get/install). restic_install/kopia_install
call it.
- scripts/system/libreportal-appcfg: {adguard-auth <user> <bcrypt>|
crowdsec-priority|owncloud-config <public> <host> <ip> <public_ip>} —
faithful ports of the AdGuard yaml / CrowdSec bouncer / ownCloud config.php
rewrites, fixed paths + validated args. adguard_auth/crowdsec_fix_priority/
owncloud_setup_config call it.
- run_privileged: runBinInstall / runAppCfg; init.sh installs + allowlists both.
Retire standalone (host-level) WireGuard — it's a duplicate of the
containerized containers/wireguard app (+ headscale mesh), its slirp4netns
speed rationale is largely moot with a better rootless net backend / typical
WAN-bound throughput, and it was the heaviest host-root subsystem (apt +
sysctl + iptables + /etc/wireguard), the worst fit for the rootless/
least-privilege direction:
- moved scripts/wireguard/ + manage_wireguard.sh + check_wireguard.sh to
scripts/unused/; dropped the install-path call, the Tools menu 'w' entry,
and the requirement check; removed the half-built libreportal-wg helper.
- generate_arrays.sh now also skips system/ (root-owned helpers, never
sourced); arrays regenerated (files_wireguard.sh pruned).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: librelad <librelad@digitalangels.vip>
Move the last runtime-critical root file-primitive subsystems behind
root-owned helpers so the type switcher + task service work under a scoped
sudoers:
- scripts/system/libreportal-socket: {rootless|rooted} {on|off} chmod of
the docker sockets (paths computed from config, not caller-supplied;
exit 3 = absent so the *_found flags come from its exit code)
- scripts/system/libreportal-svc: GENERATES + installs the systemd unit
from config (mode/uid/baked manager) — never accepts unit content from
the caller (arbitrary unit = root). Idempotent install/enable/restart.
- ownership helper: add db-own + app-file <app> <relpath> actions
- run_privileged: runSocket / runSvc
- set_socket_permissions -> runSocket; webui_install_systemd -> runSvc
(+ crontab cleanup runs as the manager directly, no sudo -u self)
- before_start: db chown -> runOwnership db-own; traefik cert/yml ->
runOwnership app-file (retires updateFileOwnership/changeRootOwnedFile)
- init.sh installs all five helpers
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: librelad <librelad@digitalangels.vip>
Two more runtime root file-primitive subsystems moved behind self-
validating root-owned helpers so the scoped sudoers needn't grant blanket
sudo sed/tee/cp on /etc (which is root-equivalent — sudo arg wildcards
match across '/', so even path-scoped entries are bypassable):
- scripts/system/libreportal-dns: {clear|add <ip>} — edits /etc/resolv.conf
only, validates the IP argument
- scripts/system/libreportal-ssh-access: authorized_keys + sshd
PasswordAuthentication management, with the lockout guards moved INTO the
helper (the trust boundary) so a compromised manager can't bypass them
- run_privileged: _runRootHelper dispatcher + runResolv / runSshAccess
(runOwnership now uses it too)
- init.sh: initRootHelpers installs all three helpers root:root 0755 with
the manager name baked in
- setup_dns -> runResolv (+ ping de-sudo'd, works unprivileged); host_access
+ webui_ssh_access -> runSshAccess
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: librelad <librelad@digitalangels.vip>
Under Model A the runtime runs as the manager, so establishing the
/docker ownership model needs root. Granting the manager a blanket
'sudo chown'/'sudo chmod' in the scoped sudoers would be root-equivalent
(chown /etc/sudoers, ...). Introduce a self-contained, root-owned helper
that performs only a FIXED set of reconciles on FIXED LibrePortal paths,
with owners derived from config + a baked manager name (never the caller)
and a strictly-validated app-name argument.
- scripts/system/libreportal-ownership: the helper (actions: reconcile,
traversal, containers-top, app-perms, webui, taskdir, app-data-nobody)
- run_privileged: runOwnership wrapper (sudo the installed helper; run the
bundled copy directly when already root mid-install)
- init.sh: installOwnershipHelper bakes the manager name and installs it
root:root 0755 to /usr/local/sbin (manager can't modify it)
- libreportal_folders/app_folder/app_update_specifics/task processor:
delegate the ownership chowns to runOwnership instead of runSystem chown
This removes chown/chmod-on-/docker from the runtime sudo surface, a
prerequisite for a non-root-equivalent scoped sudoers.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: librelad <librelad@digitalangels.vip>
