The maintainer-side tool that turns a small hotfix SPEC into the two signed
artifacts the install verifies + applies (completes the hotfix product):
dist/<channel>/payloads/<id>.json(.minisig) the bounded declarative op list
dist/<channel>/index.json(.minisig) the catalog (entry upserted, serial++)
laid out exactly like get.libreportal.org serves it (local-serve testable).
- Reads a spec (envelope fields + an embedded ops array); inlines any
op `content_file` to content_b64 for convenience.
- Validates id charset + every op name against the applier's CLOSED vocabulary,
so a typo can't ship an artifact that fails-closed on every box.
- Builds the payload (sha256), the envelope (payload ref {kind,url,sha256,sig}),
and upserts it into index.json — bumping index_serial, refreshing valid_until
(LP_HOTFIX_VALID_DAYS, default 30), and recording the publisher in the
publishers map with role + the footprint public key.
- minisign-signs the payload + index when LP_MINISIGN_SECKEY is set (the offline
key, kept on the release machine, same as make_release.sh); unsigned otherwise
for local testing — `libreportal artifact apply` refuses to apply unsigned.
Verified end-to-end (unsigned mode): produces a valid index.json + payload.json
matching the §8.1 envelope that lpFetchIndex / artifactApply consume.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: librelad <librelad@digitalangels.vip>
Adds per-file integrity attestation on top of the existing signed-tarball
release flow. make_release now generates a SHA256SUMS manifest over the shipped
tree and (when a key is configured) signs it, riding both inside the release
tarball so they land in the install tree with no extra download.
lpVerifyInstall (scripts/source/verify.sh) re-hashes the install tree against
that manifest and verifies the manifest's minisign signature against the
root-owned footprint pubkey, yielding states: verified / modified / tampered /
unsigned / unverifiable / development. webuiSystemVerify writes verify_status.json
(throttled daily, force on demand, also after each update apply), surfaced as an
Integrity line + "Verify now" button on the Admin → Overview Updates card and a
row in the update details panel. `libreportal verify` exposes the same check on
the CLI.
Honest framing: this is a self-check (run by the software it verifies), so red
fires only for genuine modified/tampered states; the badge tooltip points to
out-of-band `minisign -Vm` for an independent guarantee.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: librelad <librelad@digitalangels.vip>
Add `lpRegen` (scripts/webui/webui_regen.sh) — one entry point that rebuilds the
file-derived artifacts whose sources changed, so callers don't have to know which
generator owns what. Self-heal is a cheap `find -newer` mtime compare (no watcher
/ daemon): a stage runs only when a source is newer than its artifact, or --force.
- `libreportal regen [all|webui|arrays] [--force]` CLI command (new category).
- Task processor idle tick runs a throttled `regen webui` poll, so an app dropped
in out-of-band (drag-drop / marketplace) appears on its own — no manual command,
no inotify (works on the relocatable/external-drive roots where inotify can't).
- make_release.sh guards against shipping stale source arrays (regenerate; abort
if the committed tree was out of date), killing the "forgot generate_arrays" bug
class at the build boundary.
- Document the front door in DEVELOPMENT.md.
webui scope rebuilds from containers/<app>/{*.config,tools/*.tools.json}; arrays
scope from scripts/** (a dev/build concern — a no-op on a normal install). Gate
logic verified in a sandbox (clean/config-newer/tools-newer/force/missing).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: librelad <librelad@digitalangels.vip>
The sha256 only proves a download is intact; a compromised host could swap the
tarball + its checksum. Add minisign signatures, which prove authenticity (the host
can't forge them without the offline secret key). Ships INACTIVE behind a REPLACE_ME
placeholder, so installs work until a real key is generated; then it's REQUIRED.
- make_release.sh: signs the tarball when LP_MINISIGN_SECKEY is set -> <tarball>.minisig.
- libreportal.pub: the public key (placeholder), ships in the tarball and is installed
to the ROOT-OWNED footprint (/usr/local/lib/libreportal/libreportal.pub) by init.sh
-> the manager can't swap it to accept forged updates. footprint_version -> 2.
- install.sh: LP_MINISIGN_PUBKEY constant; once non-placeholder, downloads + verifies
the .minisig (minisign -P) and REFUSES on invalid/missing (auto-installs minisign if
needed). --no-verify-signature is a dev-only escape hatch.
- fetch.sh (update path): verifies against the footprint .pub (minisign -p), refuses on
invalid/missing.
- docs/DEVELOPMENT.md: keygen (minisign -G), paste pubkey into libreportal.pub +
install.sh, keep the secret key offline, sign builds via LP_MINISIGN_SECKEY, bump
footprint_version on key rotation.
Verified end-to-end with a real throwaway key: good signature accepted; tampered,
wrong-key, and missing-signature all refused; placeholder skips (sha256 still enforced).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: librelad <librelad@digitalangels.vip>
A manager-run 'update apply' refreshes code/apps/WebUI but CANNOT rewrite the
root-owned footprint (helpers/wrapper/uninstall/unit/sudoers) — that immutability
is the de-sudo boundary. Previously a release that changed those would silently
leave them stale. Make it explicit:
- init.sh: footprint_version=1 constant, baked at install into
/usr/local/lib/libreportal/.footprint_version (root:root 0644) by initRootHelpers.
Bump it whenever a root component changes.
- make_release.sh: publishes footprint_version in latest.json.
- fetch.sh: lpInstalledFootprintVersion (marker) + lpReleaseLatestFootprint (manifest).
- check_update.sh: 'update apply' REFUSES when the release's footprint_version
exceeds the installed one, directing to a root re-install (which fetches +
re-bakes everything atomically). No half-applied updates.
- webui_system_update.sh: badge sets footprint_update_needed + clears can_update so
the WebUI won't offer a one-click apply for a footprint-bumping release.
- docs/DEVELOPMENT.md: the bump rule + the footprint exception explained.
Verified: manifest carries footprint_version; drift decision correct both ways
(no marker/older -> needs re-install; equal -> no drift).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: librelad <librelad@digitalangels.vip>
scripts/release/make_release.sh builds a versioned, checksum-verified release
artifact from the committed tree via 'git archive' — the basis for installing
LibrePortal without git/auth. Output lands in dist/<channel>/ laid out as the
hosting will serve it (libreportal-<ver>.tar.gz + .sha256 + latest.json), so it
can be served locally for testing via LP_RELEASE_BASE_URL.
.gitattributes marks dev-only trees export-ignore (scripts/unused, scripts/release,
site, .claude, CONTRIBUTING.md, the git meta files) so they never ship; validated
the archive includes init.sh/start.sh/scripts/configs/containers/VERSION and
excludes all of the above. dist/ gitignored.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: librelad <librelad@digitalangels.vip>
