Adds the decision half of the app updater. Detection (P2) and the
snapshot-first apply/revert (P3) were already real, but nothing ever
pressed the button — every update waited for a click.
CFG_<APP>_UPDATE_TYPE=auto|manual per app, default auto (33 templates)
CFG_UPDATER_AUTO=true|false master switch, default true
updaterAppPolicy resolves the two the way backupResolveStrategy already
resolves backup strategy: the global switch can only make things more
manual. updaterApplyAuto runs at the end of `updater check` and enqueues
the ordinary updater_apply task for each auto app that has an update —
never applies inline, so an automatic update is the same code path, task
log, History entry and Roll back button as a manual one.
Safety: each attempt stamps its target digest under generated/auto/, so a
build that fails is rolled back and then left alone rather than retried on
every scan; in-flight updater tasks are skipped so scans can't stack.
Tracked end to end: updates.json carries each app's resolved update_type,
History entries carry trigger=manual|auto. The WebUI says whether updates
install themselves, chips only the apps that opted out, labels automatic
history, and — since an auto app's pending update needs no decision — keeps
it off the Overview board's "Needs action" view.
Also fixes artifactApplyAuto enqueueing without --detach: it runs inside
the single-threaded task processor's own poll, so following the new task in
the foreground waits for a task that cannot start until it returns.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The App Center blurb ran three sentences, two of which restated things
the Security view already makes obvious. Keep the what, drop the rest.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
A user rightly noted the Security section read as a wall of unrelated
dependency CVEs against an 'Up to date' app — no cue for what, if anything,
to do. Make it answer 'is this my problem, and will updating fix it?':
- Scanner (trivy_scan.sh): stop discarding Trivy's Class/Type/Status at the
jq flatten — bind them onto each vuln so the UI can tell an OS package from
the app's own bundled dependency, and a real fix from a won't-fix.
- Security section (updater-page.js): explain these are vulnerabilities in the
packages bundled in the image (not the app version), tally 'N with a fix ·
M no fix yet', then split the list into a 'Fix available' group (worst-first,
each row tagged OS/dependency and showing installed -> fixed) and a dimmed
'No fix yet' group. No fabricated 'this update fixes N' claim — fixed_in vs
the image tag isn't a reliable join, so we only state fix availability.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The authoritative icon source containers/trivy/trivy.svg held a generic
hand-drawn shield/magnifier placeholder, while the frontend copy had the
official brand mark. The icon sync (webuiSyncAppIcons) treats the source as
canonical, so it was clobbering the official logo with the placeholder on
every full WebUI update/install — leaving the setup wizard's app tile
showing the generic icon. Replace the source with the official logo so it
sticks.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add a `#LIBREPORTAL|<APP>_VERSION_TAG|<current-tag>` sentinel to each app's
anchor (`<slug>-service`) image line, so a `CFG_<APP>_VERSION` config drives
that tag through the existing tagging system — the config becomes the source,
the compose tag is derived (like ports/IPs/domains already are). This is the
"install/pin a specific version" knob.
- Placeholder is the literal current tag (e.g. `31-fpm-alpine`), NOT a `*_DATA`
token: an unset var leaves the line untouched (inert comment, keeps the real
tag) and never trips the up_app stale-tag scanner.
- Only the anchor line is tagged (sidecars mariadb/redis/nginx stay
tracked-by-digest, not user-version-picked). ollama correctly targets
`ollama/ollama`, not the companion open-webui.
- Untagged anchors normalized to `:latest` (semantic no-op) so they're
templatable too. The manager (libreportal) is skipped — it updates via its
release channel, not a docker tag.
32 apps wired. Verified: CFG_NEXTCLOUD_VERSION=32 → `nextcloud:32` (prefix
preserved, idempotent, sidecars untouched); all compose files still valid YAML.
Inert until a version config is set, so no behaviour change on existing installs.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: librelad <librelad@digitalangels.vip>
An offline trivy install crash-looped (server FATALs when it can't fetch the
vuln DB), and on rootless docker the restart storm churned the shared network's
port-forwarder until the WebUI's own published host port was torn down — the
WebUI stayed healthy INSIDE its container but was unreachable from the host, with
nothing detecting or healing it.
Three fixes, in the house self-healing style (mirrors the network-drift trio):
1. Control-plane health checker wired into the existing task-processor idle poll
(maybeRegenPoll), no new daemon. dockerHealthScan (read-only) detects daemon
down, a WebUI running-but-host-port-unreachable (the port-forward corruption),
and crash-looping containers. webuiSystemHealthCheck writes
frontend/data/system/health_status.json + self-dispatches a heal — the user
can't click a button on a dead WebUI, so the poll drives the fix. Frontend
health-notifier surfaces a topbar badge + dashboard banner + details panel.
2. Failure cap, enforced centrally by dockerHealthHeal (task-gated): stops
crash-loopers (removing the churn), restarts the WebUI to re-publish a lost
port forward, and — only if that fails — recycles the rootless daemon and
restarts the core container. Caps every app immediately, no template churn.
3. Trivy no longer crash-loops offline: the server runs in a shell retry-loop so
the container stays Up and quietly retries on a backoff instead of exiting
FATAL. Verified: container stays Up across repeated DB-download failures.
Core WebUI compose gains restart: unless-stopped so it self-recovers after a
reboot / daemon recycle instead of staying down.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: librelad <librelad@digitalangels.vip>
The client scan resolved images by pulling from Docker Hub, which fails on an
offline/privacy box ("index.docker.io ... network is unreachable") — yet every
installed app's image is already present locally. Point Trivy at the docker
socket that's already bind-mounted into the container (--image-src docker, plus
DOCKER_HOST=unix:///run/user/<uid>/docker.sock for rootless, derived from the
install user — rooted's default path is found automatically). Scans local
images with zero network. Verified: aquasec/trivy:latest -> 28 CVEs.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Standalone `docker exec trivy-service trivy image ...` opens the vuln-DB cache
the long-lived server already holds, failing with "cache may be in use by
another process: timeout" — so every scan silently returned [] (apps: 0 even on
vulnerable images). Point the exec'd client at the server (--server
http://localhost:4954, the container's fixed --listen port); the server owns the
DB, the client just submits the image. Verified against alpine:3.10.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Trivy runs as a server whose vulnerability DB downloads on first boot; until it
lands no scan can produce results. Previously the updater generator wrote an
empty-but-valid cves.json the moment the file was missing, so installing Trivy
painted a green "no known vulnerabilities" all-clear that was actually a lie —
the DB hadn't even downloaded, and the Updates/Security view gave no signal.
Add an honest scanner state the WebUI branches on:
- containers/trivy/scripts/trivy_scan.sh — trivyScannerState (absent |
db_updating | ready) via `trivy version -f json`, trivyDbUpdatedAt, and
trivyScanImageCves (per-image scan normalized to {id,severity,package,
installed,fixed_in,url}, deduped). All degrade safely on error.
- webui_updater_scan.sh — stamp cves.json with scanner.state; only run real
per-image scans once the DB is ready. Always rewritten so state tracks live.
- updater-page.js — Security tab shows a loading box while the DB updates, an
install nudge when absent, and the genuine 🎉 only when ready+empty; Overview
CVE card sub + hint reflect the state.
- overview-manager.js — fleet Security row surfaces the "building CVE database"
pending state instead of silently omitting.
- function_manifest.sh — regenerated for the new trivy_scan.sh functions.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
New containers/trivy app (aquasec/trivy in server mode, private API port,
docker socket + cache volume) in the security,recommended categories, plus
placement in the setup wizard recommended step, the server-side install
tier after crowdsec, and the CLI first-install prompt. The updater's CVE
scan (design doc P4) will gate on this app being installed; §5 of the
design doc updated to record the app-based decision.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: librelad <librelad@digitalangels.vip>
