A user rightly noted the Security section read as a wall of unrelated
dependency CVEs against an 'Up to date' app — no cue for what, if anything,
to do. Make it answer 'is this my problem, and will updating fix it?':
- Scanner (trivy_scan.sh): stop discarding Trivy's Class/Type/Status at the
jq flatten — bind them onto each vuln so the UI can tell an OS package from
the app's own bundled dependency, and a real fix from a won't-fix.
- Security section (updater-page.js): explain these are vulnerabilities in the
packages bundled in the image (not the app version), tally 'N with a fix ·
M no fix yet', then split the list into a 'Fix available' group (worst-first,
each row tagged OS/dependency and showing installed -> fixed) and a dimmed
'No fix yet' group. No fabricated 'this update fixes N' claim — fixed_in vs
the image tag isn't a reliable join, so we only state fix availability.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The client scan resolved images by pulling from Docker Hub, which fails on an
offline/privacy box ("index.docker.io ... network is unreachable") — yet every
installed app's image is already present locally. Point Trivy at the docker
socket that's already bind-mounted into the container (--image-src docker, plus
DOCKER_HOST=unix:///run/user/<uid>/docker.sock for rootless, derived from the
install user — rooted's default path is found automatically). Scans local
images with zero network. Verified: aquasec/trivy:latest -> 28 CVEs.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Standalone `docker exec trivy-service trivy image ...` opens the vuln-DB cache
the long-lived server already holds, failing with "cache may be in use by
another process: timeout" — so every scan silently returned [] (apps: 0 even on
vulnerable images). Point the exec'd client at the server (--server
http://localhost:4954, the container's fixed --listen port); the server owns the
DB, the client just submits the image. Verified against alpine:3.10.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Trivy runs as a server whose vulnerability DB downloads on first boot; until it
lands no scan can produce results. Previously the updater generator wrote an
empty-but-valid cves.json the moment the file was missing, so installing Trivy
painted a green "no known vulnerabilities" all-clear that was actually a lie —
the DB hadn't even downloaded, and the Updates/Security view gave no signal.
Add an honest scanner state the WebUI branches on:
- containers/trivy/scripts/trivy_scan.sh — trivyScannerState (absent |
db_updating | ready) via `trivy version -f json`, trivyDbUpdatedAt, and
trivyScanImageCves (per-image scan normalized to {id,severity,package,
installed,fixed_in,url}, deduped). All degrade safely on error.
- webui_updater_scan.sh — stamp cves.json with scanner.state; only run real
per-image scans once the DB is ready. Always rewritten so state tracks live.
- updater-page.js — Security tab shows a loading box while the DB updates, an
install nudge when absent, and the genuine 🎉 only when ready+empty; Overview
CVE card sub + hint reflect the state.
- overview-manager.js — fleet Security row surfaces the "building CVE database"
pending state instead of silently omitting.
- function_manifest.sh — regenerated for the new trivy_scan.sh functions.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
