A 4-lens adversarial security review of the Phase 2 applier raised 19 issues
and confirmed 17 after per-finding verification. All are trust-boundary (they
require the signing key), but several break the explicit "no code-exec, always
reversible, nothing-silent" contract, so all 17 are fixed:
Trust path — fail CLOSED, never misreport:
- lpFetchIndex now surfaces the real signature state (LP_INDEX_SIGSTATE);
artifactApply REFUSES to mutate unless the index is actually verified, and
_artifactFetchPayload refuses an unsigned payload. The read path still
tolerates dev/unsigned but now says "UNSIGNED" instead of "Signed + verified".
- valid_until and index_serial are now MANDATORY + numeric in lpFetchIndex
(missing = refuse) — closes the anti-withholding / anti-rollback fail-opens.
Injection / code-exec (defense in depth even for a signed payload):
- runFileWrite rootless branch no longer builds a `bash -c` shell string with the
destination interpolated — it uses the argv form (like runFileOp), so a path
with a quote can't inject a command as the install user. (shared-helper fix)
- op paths must match a safe-filename charset (no quotes/$/backtick/;/newline);
set-config-key values and set-compose-image refs are charset-guarded too.
- content_b64 is validated as real base64 at precheck.
Reversibility / honest failure:
- dockerComposeUp now returns the real compose exit status (it always returned 0,
so the updater's rollback gate AND the apply's start-failure detection were
fail-open). (shared-helper fix)
- set-config-key undo captures the WHOLE config file (lossless) instead of a
lossy re-parsed scalar; edit-only (rejects an absent key).
- _artifactReplayUndoFile returns non-zero if any inverse op fails; auto-rollback
and revert now record "rollback-incomplete"/"revert-incomplete" + isError
instead of falsely claiming success, and revert keeps the record for retry.
- applied-record write failure is checked — apply rolls back rather than leave an
un-revertable change. System-scope regen failure is no longer swallowed.
- Writes are path-aware (configs/ -> runInstallWrite, container tree ->
runFileWrite) so system-scope hotfixes write/restore correctly.
- Checked lazy-sourcing surfaces a clear error instead of a bare exit 127.
Unit-tested 35/35 (adds: command-sub value rejection, bad image-ref, invalid
base64, quote/metachar path-injection rejection, replay-failure reporting).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: librelad <librelad@digitalangels.vip>
Two more cases of the manager writing directly into the container-owned
/libreportal-containers tree (same class as the regen-poll stamp), both masked
by a '✓ Success' that printed anyway:
- Password replacers (config/password/*): used 'runInstallOp sed -i' (manager)
on app configs copied into the container tree, so sed -i EACCES'd its temp
file and the substitution silently failed — the adguard.config 'couldn't open
temporary file', leaving the literal RANDOMIZEDPASSWORD placeholder. Added
runCfgOp (picks runFileOp vs runInstallOp by the target file's location) and
routed every $file grep/sed/awk through it: password, username, hex, vapid,
appkey, and bcrypt.
- Updater generator (webui_updater_scan): 'runFileOp cp <manager-tmp>' can't
read the manager's 0600 mktemp as the container user, so it fell through to a
manager 'cp' that EACCES'd on the container-owned out_dir. Switched the three
writes to 'runFileWrite < tmp' (manager shell reads the tmp; container user
tees the write).
Both deploy via the normal quick path (relocatable scripts) — no footprint bump,
no reinstall.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: librelad <librelad@digitalangels.vip>
CrowdSec's host-side install (the agent + nftables bouncer the LibrePortal
Traefik plugin talks to) had stayed on blanket sudo throughout the rootless +
de-sudo hardening: `sudo apt-get install crowdsec`, `curl | sudo bash`,
`sudo sed -i /etc/crowdsec/config.yaml`, `sudo touch + sudo chmod /var/log/
crowdsec*.log`, `echo $key | sudo tee /etc/crowdsec/traefik_bouncer.key`,
plus `sudo cscli capi register / console enroll / bouncers add`. None of
those are in the scoped LP_HELPERS / LP_SYSTEM sudoers grant the manager
now holds, so any user who enabled crowdsec would have hit hard sudo
failures on every privileged step.
Follow the libreportal-appcfg / libreportal-bininstall pattern: one new
root-owned helper at /usr/local/lib/libreportal/libreportal-crowdsec
that does every privileged op behind a fixed action vocabulary with strict
argument validation. The manager calls in via runCrowdsec — the scoped
sudoers grants exactly one binary, the same trust boundary the other
helpers rely on.
Actions:
install apt repo + agent + firewall-bouncer + enable +
crowdsecurity/{linux,sshd} collections + reload
(idempotent — skips parts already in place)
services <verb> enable | disable | restart
capi <verb> register | unregister | status
console <verb> enroll <token> | disenroll | status
token format strictly validated
bouncer-traefik-init cscli register + write the manager-owned key file
atomically (returns EXISTS or GENERATED:<key>)
bouncer-priority bouncer yaml nftables priority → -100
(moved from libreportal-appcfg; one helper for
every crowdsec root op)
bind-lapi flip listen_uri to 0.0.0.0:8080 in config.yaml
prometheus <on…|off> flip the prometheus block (validated addr/port)
touch-host-logs create + chmod 0644 /var/log/crowdsec*.log so the
libreportal container can tail them
Wired in via:
- new sudoers Cmnd_Alias entry for the helper in LP_HELPERS
- new helper baked alongside the others by initRootHelpers
(replaces __SYSTEM_DIR__ / __CONTAINERS_DIR__ / __MANAGER__ at
install, with safe runtime fallbacks if unbaked)
- new runCrowdsec dispatch in scripts/docker/command/run_privileged.sh
containers/crowdsec/scripts/crowdsec_install_host.sh now drives the whole
flow through runCrowdsec — every `sudo …` is gone, the compose-toggle sed
uses runFileOp, and the security_crowdsec CFG mirror uses runInstallOp
(configs/ is manager-owned). Net: install script shrinks ~80 lines while
gaining a single auditable trust boundary. crowdsec_fix_priority.sh swung
over to runCrowdsec bouncer-priority too — the appcfg crowdsec_priority
action drops out cleanly.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: librelad <librelad@digitalangels.vip>
runBackupOp dropped privileges to $docker_install_user with `sudo -E`,
which preserves the CALLER's environment — including HOME. The caller is
the manager (libreportal), so restic-running-as-dockerinstall ended up
with HOME=/home/libreportal and tried to mkdir
`/home/libreportal/.cache/restic` for its cache. dockerinstall can't
write into libreportal's home, so every backup ran with:
unable to open cache: mkdir /home/libreportal/.cache/restic: permission denied
twice (once in backup, once in the verify-via-scratch-restore step), with
restic falling back to a no-cache run that's a few × slower than it
should be.
Add `-H` (sudo's "reset HOME to target user's home"). Now restic sees
HOME=/home/dockerinstall, creates ~/.cache/restic there (dockerinstall
owns its own home, no help needed), and the warning is gone. Confirmed
live: a `backup app create linkding` round-trip is silent on cache, and
the dir lands at /home/dockerinstall/.cache/restic, mode 0700, correctly
owned.
All restic/borg/kopia calls funnel through runBackupOp, so this single
character fix covers every backup-tool invocation.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: librelad <librelad@digitalangels.vip>
Introduce scripts/source/paths.sh as the canonical path resolver for three
independently-relocatable roots:
LP_SYSTEM_DIR manager-owned control plane (configs/logs/install/db/ssl/ssh/migrate)
LP_CONTAINERS_DIR container-user-owned live app data
LP_BACKUPS_DIR container-user-owned backup repos (own mount-able)
Roots come from the environment when set (install bakes them; CLI/app inherit
from init.sh), else default to /libreportal-*. A transitional compat default
keeps EXISTING installs (legacy single /docker tree, by config marker) on /docker
until a deliberate reinstall, so deploying this never strands a running box.
- init.sh derives the same vars inline (self-contained for the bare /root/init.sh
reinstall case); paths.sh mirrors it for the standalone task/check processors,
which now self-locate their scripts dir and source it.
- Replace functional /docker literals with the derived vars across runtime,
install, backup, crontab, crowdsec/restic, headscale, and reinstall paths;
clean the inert '== /docker/containers/*' guard fallbacks to the variable form.
- backend: CONTAINERS_DIR now from LP_CONTAINERS_DIR (compose env, filled at
generation via a new CONTAINERS_DIR_TAG), legacy-safe default for un-recreated
containers.
- backup default path falls back to the backups root; exclude paths.sh from the
sourced-file arrays (bootstrap file, sourced explicitly).
The CLI-wrapper heredoc + root helpers still reference /docker; those get baked
in phase 3. No layout/ownership change yet (phase 2).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: librelad <librelad@digitalangels.vip>
Organise the system footprint outside /docker:
- All LibrePortal executables now live together in /usr/local/lib/libreportal/
(root:root): the 7 root helpers AND the CLI wrapper. /usr/local/bin/libreportal
becomes a symlink onto $PATH. run_privileged._runRootHelper, init.sh
(initRootHelpers + scoped-sudoers Cmnd_Alias + command setup) all point there.
The wrapper is now root-owned too (manager can't tamper with its entrypoint).
- Fix a real bug: rootless sysctl settings were written to /etc/sysctl/99-custom.conf,
a dir does NOT read, so net.ipv4.ip_unprivileged_port_start /
kernel.unprivileged_userns_clone never persisted across reboot. Moved to
/etc/sysctl.d/99-libreportal-rootless.conf (the existing
reload now actually applies them). Consistent libreportal* naming.
- Drop dead fqdn_file=/root/libreportal-fqdn.txt global (never used).
- Add FOOTPRINT.md: a manifest of every file LibrePortal places outside /docker
(doubles as an uninstall checklist).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: librelad <librelad@digitalangels.vip>
Bring the remaining deferred subsystems under the scoped sudoers, and drop
the one that's redundant.
Backup engines + app configs -> root-owned helpers (same pattern as
ownership/dns/ssh/socket/svc):
- scripts/system/libreportal-bininstall: install <restic|kopia> — does the
whole pkg-manager/signed-download install itself for a fixed, validated
engine name (no blanket sudo apt-get/install). restic_install/kopia_install
call it.
- scripts/system/libreportal-appcfg: {adguard-auth <user> <bcrypt>|
crowdsec-priority|owncloud-config <public> <host> <ip> <public_ip>} —
faithful ports of the AdGuard yaml / CrowdSec bouncer / ownCloud config.php
rewrites, fixed paths + validated args. adguard_auth/crowdsec_fix_priority/
owncloud_setup_config call it.
- run_privileged: runBinInstall / runAppCfg; init.sh installs + allowlists both.
Retire standalone (host-level) WireGuard — it's a duplicate of the
containerized containers/wireguard app (+ headscale mesh), its slirp4netns
speed rationale is largely moot with a better rootless net backend / typical
WAN-bound throughput, and it was the heaviest host-root subsystem (apt +
sysctl + iptables + /etc/wireguard), the worst fit for the rootless/
least-privilege direction:
- moved scripts/wireguard/ + manage_wireguard.sh + check_wireguard.sh to
scripts/unused/; dropped the install-path call, the Tools menu 'w' entry,
and the requirement check; removed the half-built libreportal-wg helper.
- generate_arrays.sh now also skips system/ (root-owned helpers, never
sourced); arrays regenerated (files_wireguard.sh pruned).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: librelad <librelad@digitalangels.vip>
Move the last runtime-critical root file-primitive subsystems behind
root-owned helpers so the type switcher + task service work under a scoped
sudoers:
- scripts/system/libreportal-socket: {rootless|rooted} {on|off} chmod of
the docker sockets (paths computed from config, not caller-supplied;
exit 3 = absent so the *_found flags come from its exit code)
- scripts/system/libreportal-svc: GENERATES + installs the systemd unit
from config (mode/uid/baked manager) — never accepts unit content from
the caller (arbitrary unit = root). Idempotent install/enable/restart.
- ownership helper: add db-own + app-file <app> <relpath> actions
- run_privileged: runSocket / runSvc
- set_socket_permissions -> runSocket; webui_install_systemd -> runSvc
(+ crontab cleanup runs as the manager directly, no sudo -u self)
- before_start: db chown -> runOwnership db-own; traefik cert/yml ->
runOwnership app-file (retires updateFileOwnership/changeRootOwnedFile)
- init.sh installs all five helpers
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: librelad <librelad@digitalangels.vip>
Two more runtime root file-primitive subsystems moved behind self-
validating root-owned helpers so the scoped sudoers needn't grant blanket
sudo sed/tee/cp on /etc (which is root-equivalent — sudo arg wildcards
match across '/', so even path-scoped entries are bypassable):
- scripts/system/libreportal-dns: {clear|add <ip>} — edits /etc/resolv.conf
only, validates the IP argument
- scripts/system/libreportal-ssh-access: authorized_keys + sshd
PasswordAuthentication management, with the lockout guards moved INTO the
helper (the trust boundary) so a compromised manager can't bypass them
- run_privileged: _runRootHelper dispatcher + runResolv / runSshAccess
(runOwnership now uses it too)
- init.sh: initRootHelpers installs all three helpers root:root 0755 with
the manager name baked in
- setup_dns -> runResolv (+ ping de-sudo'd, works unprivileged); host_access
+ webui_ssh_access -> runSshAccess
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: librelad <librelad@digitalangels.vip>
Under Model A the runtime runs as the manager, so establishing the
/docker ownership model needs root. Granting the manager a blanket
'sudo chown'/'sudo chmod' in the scoped sudoers would be root-equivalent
(chown /etc/sudoers, ...). Introduce a self-contained, root-owned helper
that performs only a FIXED set of reconciles on FIXED LibrePortal paths,
with owners derived from config + a baked manager name (never the caller)
and a strictly-validated app-name argument.
- scripts/system/libreportal-ownership: the helper (actions: reconcile,
traversal, containers-top, app-perms, webui, taskdir, app-data-nobody)
- run_privileged: runOwnership wrapper (sudo the installed helper; run the
bundled copy directly when already root mid-install)
- init.sh: installOwnershipHelper bakes the manager name and installs it
root:root 0755 to /usr/local/sbin (manager can't modify it)
- libreportal_folders/app_folder/app_update_specifics/task processor:
delegate the ownership chowns to runOwnership instead of runSystem chown
This removes chown/chmod-on-/docker from the runtime sudo surface, a
prerequisite for a non-root-equivalent scoped sudoers.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: librelad <librelad@digitalangels.vip>
The borg/restic/kopia engines all dropped to the dedicated backup user
via scattered 'sudo -E -u $docker_install_user'. Centralize that into a
single runBackupOp helper so the backup subsystem has one audit point and
the scoped sudoers needs only the (dockerinstall) drop rule.
Also:
- owncloud config heredoc tees -> runSystem (container-UID file)
- webui_display_logins: fix the broken 'command -v sudo sqlite3' guard
to 'command -v sqlite3' (body already runs sqlite3 via runInstallOp)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: librelad <librelad@digitalangels.vip>
Maintainer confirmed the intended model: the manager user (libreportal, in the
docker group) owns /docker in BOTH modes and runs things directly; root:root was
always an accident of un-de-sudo'd sudo. Rework the helpers accordingly:
- add runAsManager (run as the manager: plain when already it at runtime, else
sudo -u at install time) so files end up manager-owned, never root-owned.
- runFileOp/runFileWrite: rooted -> runAsManager (was sudo->root); rootless
unchanged (docker install user owns containers/).
- runInstallOp/runInstallWrite: always runAsManager (control plane is manager-
owned in both modes).
- runSystem unchanged (genuine root: apt/systemctl/ufw/sysctl).
All ~40 converted call sites inherit this via the helpers. reconcile's WebUI dir
now -> manager in rooted / docker install user in rootless.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: librelad <librelad@digitalangels.vip>
Reinstall test on Debian 12 surfaced three rootless-only breakages (rooted
was byte-identical/fine):
1. pasta blocked by Debian's passt AppArmor profile (DENIED ptrace read ->
can't open container netns -> rootless dockerd never starts). Default
CFG_ROOTLESS_NET back to slirp4netns (reliable); pasta stays selectable
for hosts that relax the profile.
2. de-sudo mis-assigned helpers by owner. /docker management layer (apps DB
chowned to libreportal by install_sqlite, /docker/logs) is MANAGER-owned,
not dockerinstall. Add runInstallWrite; move apps-DB sqlite3 -> runInstallOp
and /docker/logs appends -> runInstallWrite. Revert ownership-SETUP scripts
(libreportal_folders, app_folder) to runSystem — they must run as root to
establish ownership during install. Container files (/docker/containers/<app>)
stay runFileOp.
3. kernel hardening sysctls written to /etc/sysctl/99-custom.conf, which
'sysctl --system' does not read -> never applied. Write them to
/etc/sysctl.d/99-libreportal-hardening.conf instead.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: librelad <librelad@digitalangels.vip>
- New runInstallOp helper for manager install-dir/template ops (rooted:
sudo; rootless: run as the current manager user, which owns the tree).
- adguard.sh, traefik.sh: container-config sed -> runFileOp.
- crowdsec.sh: host crowdsec systemctl/apt-get -> runSystem.
- dashy_update_conf.sh: conf-file mkdir/chown/md5sum/tee -> runFileOp/
runFileWrite; docker ps/restart -> dockerCommandRun.
Deferred (cross-owner copy / temp-file across /tmp<->/docker, need rootless
env to bridge correctly): owncloud_setup_config.sh, adguard_auth.sh.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: librelad <librelad@digitalangels.vip>
Add -a/--append to runFileWrite so the pervasive /docker/logs log-append
idiom (`… | sudo tee -a $logs_dir/$docker_log_file`) routes through the
mode-aware helper instead of raw sudo.
Convert scripts/config/docker/docker_config_to_container.sh fully: all
ops target /docker app config + logs (data-plane), so md5sum/grep/chmod/
cmp/editor -> runFileOp and the log-appends -> runFileWrite -a.
Byte-identical in rooted.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: librelad <librelad@digitalangels.vip>
Give dockerCommandRunInstallUser an --argv mode that execs arguments
verbatim (sudo -u <user> env ... "$@") instead of bash -c "$*", and
point runFileOp at it. The old $*+bash -c re-parse silently mangled
backslashes/quotes in args — e.g. sed scripts (\1, \( become 1, ( ) and
the sqlite3 .backup arg — so rootless data-plane ops with regex were
broken. Verified: the WG_DEFAULT_DNS sed now applies correctly as the
install user. All existing runFileOp callers pass plain commands, so the
switch is safe (and fixes the latent sqlite3 case).
Convert scripts/network/dns/setup_dns.sh: /etc/resolv.conf edits and
ping -> runSystem; the WG_DEFAULT_DNS compose-file sed -> runFileOp.
Byte-identical in rooted; correct in rootless.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: librelad <librelad@digitalangels.vip>
Single place that decides how a privileged op runs by Docker mode:
- runFileOp / runFileWrite: /docker data-plane ops — rooted uses sudo (identical
to today), rootless runs as the unprivileged install user (no root).
- runSystem: genuine system-admin ops, sudo in both modes, funnelled here so it
can later be confined to a scoped sudoers allowlist.
Call sites converted to these are byte-for-byte unchanged under rooted, so
existing/live boxes can't regress; rootless gets the de-privileged path.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: librelad <librelad@digitalangels.vip>
